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Abstract
This paper reviews one current concept of experiential learning, using the work of David Kolb as an exemplar of this genre of learning theory. Working from a relational or social constructionist perspective, the paper suggests that there are three problematic assumptions within current experiential learning cycles. First there is a realist treatment of world and events. Secondly, a distinct and independent individual is assumed to be able to experience, know and act upon this real world. Thirdly, cognition, be it in the form of knowledge, interpretation or perception, is treated as the unproblematic precursor to action. In contrast to these assumptions relational premises invite multiple narratives to replace ‘concrete experience’, social rather than individual action and co-ordination with others in contrast with to adaptation to a real world. These alternative premises form the basis of an alternative, narrative reflective cycle that is argued to offer practical reflective ‘tools’ that would be of benefit, even if the reflector did not share the author’s relational constructionist assumptions.
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Introduction
The idea of a reflective cycle as a metaphor for adaptive, experiential learning has a long history, certainly back to Dewey (1910/1933), but perhaps in the arena of organisational learning David Kolb's work is referred to most often. Other cycles exist (Henry, 1989) but I will use Kolb's (1984) cycle as an exemplar of the genre. Kolb has built a model of experiential learning that is commonly used as a heuristic in management training and education. Kolb's cycle emphasises individual, cognitive understanding and adaptation to a 'concrete', real world. From a relational, or social constructionist, perspective (Gergen, 1994; Shotter, 1993) the assumptions involved in such emphases are problematic. For example, the realist assumptions imply just one reality and blind the learner to a potential for multiple realities that could be narrated (Czarniawska, 1997). Additionally, the emphasis on knowing will tend to obscure performance by focusing attention on a concrete state of affairs, rather than attending to what we could call performed realities constructed in ongoing relations (McNamee & Gergen, 1999; Newman and Holzman, 1997). Finally the focus on the individual, as the site for reflection and experiential learning, will underestimate the joint, co-ordinated construction of any action (Shotter, 1993). As a consequence, by ascribing agency to a ‘self’, attention is distracted from the role of ‘other’ (Hosking, 2000; Sampson, 1993). These are not just purely academic issues, but can have significant practical importance. My aim in this paper is not only to critique Kolb's version of experiential learning but also to offer an alternative learning cycle that is consciously communal, narrative and action centred.
The paper will be structured in two tasks. The first task will be to outline relational constructionist premises as they relate to experiential learning, as typified by Kolb's cycle. The second task will be to develop an alternative process of learning, or developing performance. Identifying relevant relational constructionist premises will involve the development of three themes. First, I will outline the main relational premises that influence the narrative reflective cycle I introduce later. Most significantly I will outline some possible relational treatments of person as a communal, joint production (Gergen, 1991; 1994). This contrasts with the more common, individualistic treatment of person as a bounded entity. Secondly, I will set up narrative as a potentially helpful alternative to description, of a claimed ‘concrete experience’. Finally, I will explore constructionist potentials to move learning from being treated as a cognitive affair to a more performative development of practice.
Having set up the relational premises outlined above, the second task will be to construct an alternative learning cycle that attempts to tackle these problems identified in Kolb's cycle, and offers an invitation to a more performative learning cycle. In doing this I shall suggest two significant shifts from Kolb. First, instead of concrete experience I shall move to a use of narrative. Narrative, as I shall argue, offers a greater potential for hearing alternative voices and so enabling a more communal reflection on events that could be considered relevant to future joint action. Additionally, the form of narrative that I propose is consciously performative, attending to possible actions rather than descriptions of states of affairs. The second shift will be from an emphasis on adaptation, with its implicit knowledge of what is 'really going on', to co-ordination. If any action is only made intelligible, that is recognisable as including learning, as it is completed or supplemented by others then any learning process must take co-ordinated performance with others seriously. What the individual can know or conceptualise, in their own minds - to use a particularly popular metaphor - could sensibly be argued to be less important than what can be negotiated between relevant participants.


Experiential Learning
Implicit realism
Whereas Kolb talks of ‘concrete experience’ a number (eg Bruner, 1990; Gergen, 1994; McNamee & Gergen, 1999; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Shotter, 1993), writing from social constructionist or relational perspectives, would refer to relational processes by which something called experiences are constructed. From this perspective reality is an ongoing, current achievement (Dachler & Hosking, 1995). Relational processes can be described in different ways. Two such expositions will serve our purposes here.
Dachler and Hosking (1995) write of text-context relations. So, from a relational perspective, any text, be it a gesture, word or action, becomes real, that is capable of communicating meaningfully (Gergen, 1995), in relation to a referenced context. A pen, for example, becomes meaningful only in relation to contexts such as writing as communication or paper as a medium. Change the text-context relationship of pen and reference contextual narratives such as smoke signals as communication or electronic mail or slate board as media for communication and the pen may still be called a pen but it becomes meaningless and also useless. In the same way, our stories of what 'happened' gain their capacity to be real; that is to communicate and coordinate with others, as text-context relations are made. So a story about bad treatment by a boss only makes sense in text-context relations with stories of equity, bias and power. Without such text-context relations the story will not register as meaningful, or will be given very different meanings.
I have suggested a link between reality and communicate-ability. This is a point emphasised by Ken Gergen (1994; 1995) raising the second of the relational processes that I want to identify: act-supplement relations. In these two pieces Gergen writes of our construction of some ‘real and good’ world as acts are supplemented. Gergen argues that any act is equivocal, capable of multiple meanings. A handshake can be of welcome, formality or distance. Which meaning is made real depends on how another person supplements the act. A stiff, brisk handshake may take the relationship on in a cold, formal manner whilst a smile and lingering grasp may start, or continue a warm friendship. Within this concept reality ceases to be helpful as a description of some state of affairs, and is treated more as an invitation for people to co-ordinate and so go on creating and re-creating local, ephemeral and partial real worlds. From a constructionist perspective ‘reality’ can be treated as an ongoing performance, and the narrating of past events as a current performance of those events as part of a process of world making.
To talk, as Kolb does, of concrete experience requires an assumption (tacit text-context relation) that there is a world in which there are events that are distinct from people as participants, creators and observers. It makes sense to talk of experiencing something happening to us, and so distinct from us, if we make that assumption of separateness. It also makes sense, within that assumption, to talk of people interacting with others to make these experiences, but still, people are considered separate and distinct. That being the case it also becomes possible to contrast something called objective experience with subjective experience. It would be impossible to be either objective or subjective without this separation, without knowledge being posited as the possession of an individual mind. By implication, use of the term ‘concrete experience’ privileges objective observation over a subjective, and so likely to prejudiced and less real, experience. Yet, on this point Miettenen (2000) identifies a contradiction in Kolb's epistemology. He notes Kolb's use of Lewin's action research as one of the foundations of his learning theory but points out that Kolb replaces ‘data collection’ with ‘recollection’. Kolb's methodology is therefore argued to support a subjectivist epistemology, whilst claiming a starting point of concrete, or realist perspective. 
Different assumptions about reality are possible. Alternative language tools can be used to throw different lights on what we might call experience. Stenner and Eccleston (1993) write of ‘textuality’, inviting the reader to locate themselves, and experience, as text available for rewriting by any interested party. Howard (1991), Brown and Duguid (1991) and Czarniawsaka (1997) use the idea of storytelling, or narrative. Working with Wittgenstein (1953) and Bahktin (1981) we could use, respectively ‘language game’ or ‘dialogical’ experience. What all these different language tools do is to tie the knower into ongoing relations. From a relational perspective, text can not be separated from context, act can not be separated from supplement and self can not be separated from other. These relational language tools invite a reflector to avoid being tied down to one particular account, as if true. They prompt us to treat what people claim to know as saying as much about them as a situation. In Shotter's (1993) words we can only ‘know from within’ a particular community's conversations. Knowing is therefore treated as a social process; a relational premise that is different to Kolb's implicit individualism.
A reflecting individual?
A relational perspective therefore, invites a shift in our treatment of reality. From a relational perspective it no longer makes sense to treat reality as a state of affairs, instead reality as an ongoing, co-ordinated achievement is implied. This is not to say that this, relational perspective is, in some way, more accurate than a realist stance. Rather, it offers the reflector different ‘tools’ for their reflecting. For Kolb, and other experiential learning writers (eg Daudelin, 1996; Preskill, 1996; Rigano & Edwards, 1998, Schipper, 1999) experience is an individual phenomenon. It is the individual who experiences, reflects, plans and acts. Some, (for example McGill & Beaty, 1994; Reason, 1999; Torraco, 1999) have located reflection in social groups, but still this is only as a process by which a group of individuals support another in his or her own reflection and learning. From a relational perspective, it is only as an act is supplemented that it becomes meaningful. Action is consequently always a joint production, where those who co-ordinate make, in an almost physical sense, meanings.
As an alternative to treating experience as an intra-psychic event; a relational perspective allows us to relate to person, and what might be described as their experience, as a contribution to ongoing relations. So, for example, memory of an experience can be treated as a construction of relations (Sampson, 1993) contributing to an ongoing (re)creation of those relations. It is, in a sense a reframing of experience, away from being a ‘mirror’ of some real past event, to being treated as a current performance that only makes sense as it is supplemented by others physically or symbolically present (Dachler & Hosking, 1995).
The point to be made here is not that individualism is wrong. All that can be claimed from a relational perspective is that individualism is one language game (Wittgenstein, 1953) that promotes certain ‘realities’ and constrains others. Other language games, that construct ‘person’ in ways that promote less individualistic ‘realities’, are available. For example, Reason (1994) writes of a participatory worldview in which 
‘the individual, with soft and permeable character structure, will feel in alignment and community with the ‘other’, ..’ (Reason, 1994, p 27).
Here we have a corrective to an over-individualised account of self. However, a distinct self, albeit permeable and embedded in a ‘wholeness’, is still present. A relational perspective doesn’t attempt to reformulate and correct some truth game of self; instead we are offered relating as, what we might call a prime ontology. As prime numbers can not be divided, other than by themselves or one, into wholes; so a relational perspective suggests that attempting to separate out an author of an action or an experience, from amongst ongoing relating going on, creates as much confusion as it clarifies. Where does a social fashion end and an individual’s taste begin?  Where does community discourse end and an individual’s thinking commence? Instead of seeking out an indexical relationship between an individual and an act, a relational perspective focuses on the relation of acts, not the persons assumed to be making the acts, and appreciates the actors constructed within that process. We have here a very active, emergent and performative treatment of person. Experience is also treated as an action, not so much something that happens to a person, but rather a creative, joint action, in which community narratives such as, for example ‘individual experience’ are one linguistic repertoire that shared intentionality and joint action can draw upon in performing ongoing world and relations making. This performative treatment of person and world making is developed further as a narrative learning cycle is outlined.
From knowing individual to individual agent?
Miettenen (2000) criticises Kolb's cycle for separating learning from a social and cultural environment. This problem is inextricably linked with ideas of individual knowers and raises the question of how we can theorise a more socially aware learning. This problem was raised and discussed by Holman and his colleagues (Holman et al, 1997). They use the activity theory concept of ‘mediational means’ to argue that any thinking is an internalisation of interpersonal transactions. They go on: ‘people create and are created by their social conditions’ (p 140). From a social constructionist perspective it is impossible to disaggregate an individual that experiences from the social, relational processes that make any experiencing meaningful. For this reason, a relational treatment of learning must attend to socially mindful processes that emphasise performance, rather than description of and adaptation to an experience.
Returning again to one articulated relational process, Gergen's act + supplement; future or planned action can not be treated as the agency of just a reflector. Any action planned by a person is, from a relational perspective, ineluctably joint action (Shotter, 1993). From a relational perspective, two arguments can be used to demonstrate this assertion. First, for any action to appear sensible it will require the warrant of a community of practice (Brown & Duguid, 1991). Using research by Orr on the work of photocopier repair representatives, Brown and Duguid illustrated Lave and Wenger's (1991) concept of a community of practice. The representatives ignored the training output of their company and, instead, built their own community narratives to learn how to repair photocopiers. Even if reflecting is ostensibly being done by a person in isolation the disciplinary power (Foucault, 1979) of discourses relevant to that community will limit or promote actions (Hosking & Ramsey, 2000). 
Secondly, following Gergen's argument; any action will be made meaningful, that is ‘real’, as it is supplemented by another. Any action will be equivocal, carrying many potential meanings, until those potential meanings are reduced by another's action. So a wave might be a salutation across the street, the hailing of a cab, a cry for help or a request for a ball to be passed to you. There is undoubtedly waving going on here, and the hand belongs to one embodied person, yet as others co-ordinate with the action and it acquires a particular meaning, it is impossible to disentangle the act of waving from its socially constructing process. Of course, this process is often tacit - we would be most disconcerted to find a white, grass hockey ball coming towards us if we had waved to a friend across a street in London or New York!  Yet the apparent natural obviousness of these actions should not distract us from their construction process. From a relational perspective, their 'reality' is conventional not a state of affairs, as would be assumed in realist epistemology. Gergen (1994) argues that it is the constant repetition of acts and their supplements that allow us to take them for granted 'as the way things are'. In less obvious contexts alternative supplements are capable of creating new relations. For example, a friendly piece of advice can be taken as disloyal criticism and the friendship cools as visits become less frequent. From an experiential perspective, it is perfectly logical to make sense of this story with reference to terms such as misunderstandings, but an alternative perspective could be to attend to the act + supplement relation in which 'advice' is followed by a reduced number of visits and so  a new 'reality' is created. We can argue that the relationship itself is recreated. Our emphasis moves from what a person means by their contribution to how their contribution invites ongoing relation. 
Again, it must be stressed that an alternative reality is not being offered, merely that different perspectives on self offer different language tools to construct and justify actions. A perspective that privileges individual experience is not, as has been argued above, without its limitations. A relational perspective uses alternative language tools, amongst them narrative that invite different, and possibly helpful, constructions.
An emphasis on understanding?
For Kolb (1984) learning is grounded in epistemology. He quotes, approvingly, Piaget's argument that ‘.. it is impossible to dissociate psychology from epistemology.. how is knowledge acquired, how does it increase..’ (Piaget, 1978 as cited in Kolb, 1984, p 37). This emphasis on what can be known is shared through out much of organisational management. The strategy literatures encourage managers to analyse the industry (e.g. Porter, 1980). Organisational Development literatures emphasise building shared understandings. Systems or cognitive approaches (e.g. Checkland, 1981; Senge 1990, Huff, 1990) developed a use of mental models. Learning company or, increasingly, knowledge management theories wrestle with the problems of transferring individual knowledge to the organisation. Even more post-modern treatments of organising lay weight on meanings (eg Czarniawska, 1997). The universal treatment of knowledge as an ingredient, and probably the crucial ingredient of management, is taken for granted and seems so obvious as to defy critique.
The ‘knowledge’ language game (to extend Wittgenstein) is not, however, the only game that can be played. Knowing is problematical. From a relational perspective, I have already argued that knowing is treated as a relational process, with infinite possible text-context relations available to make infinite 'realities' meaningful. No universal measure of the correctness of any particular meaning is available. Given that starting point, even if we accept that knowledge of what is the case is going to be imperfect or only ‘probabilistically apprehendable’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1996), issues of power follow logically on. 
If we argue that any knowing is in some way subject to Foucault's (1979) disciplinary power, then knowing will always involve some form of constraint. Gergen (1995) argued this in saying that communities would construct, maintain and reinforce local ontologies - that which is related to as real and good. Other, alternative realities would be subject to a centrifugal power that forced these alternatives apart, through processes of categorisation, ranking and denigration. Eisler (1991) writes of these processes as growing within a dominator model of relating and Sampson (1993) captures the process terming the resulting actions as monological. In this way some actions will be promoted as good and others will be denigrated as unsatisfactory. A key issue here is to recall the relational argument that there is no universal measures available for accrediting action, all our ways of knowing are generated socially (Woolgar, 1993). Furthermore, as Gergen argues, constant repetitions of act/supplement relations may create a sense of naturalness at a tacit level and people, within local ontology, are empowered to take certain truths for granted.
The above argument lifts two dangers for those interested in reflective learning. First, if much of this reality constructing process is tacit and taken for granted, then it will not be available for critique for those involved in reflective learning. Foucault (1979) referred to this as the disciplinary power of institutions, where, to use his argument, the individual internalised the rules, so making them their own: undeniable. We could use other terms to capture this idea: assumptions, schema, mental models, cultural narratives, discourses or scripts. Each of these terms carry the idea that there are ways of knowing that are not available for discussion, and so likely to shape our reflection. Examples of this situation are common in business, with the demise of the Swiss watch industry at the hands of the electronic watch manufacturers being a case in point.
Secondly, reflective learning that is focused on individual knowledge runs the danger of neglecting the importance of social processes in making that 'knowing' real. When we locate knowledge as a collection of 'facts' and causal relations inside a person's head, we give this knowledge an artificial 'objectivity'. Gergen (1995) writes about what is real and good becoming conventional; that is those 'facts' are constructed. As such they are manufactured artefacts, and before they are to be trusted their construction process, including the contribution of power relations, may need unpacking. So, it can be argued a 'local' community can take for granted the 'truth' of any assertion without questioning it. This, in itself, is a denial of a key aspect of reflective practice and is one of the reasons for the ‘telling’ of other possible narratives discussed below.
A relational perspective argues that knowing is a social process, and as such is constructive rather than descriptive. Indeed I would now want to take this point further by suggesting that knowing can be usefully treated as redundant. It is not so much that we can know about because of social relations, but that the very world that we claim to know about is socially constructed as we relate. We can justifiably turn our interest to processes of world and person making (Hosking, 1999) or history making (Newman & Holzman, 1993). An aspiration to know inserts an unnecessary step into our social world making relations. A focus on knowing will inevitably turn us inward. We can not easily escape the linguistic repertoires that locate knowledge, schema, mental models or sense making as an individual's mind content. Other terms too, such as understanding or sensemaking (Weick, 1995), maintain the same separation of apprehend-er and apprehended. Holzman and Newman (1997) write of an end to knowing offering instead, development as a ‘growing without knowing’, using improvisation in order to facilitate developmental performances in social, political and organisational contexts.
To shift our interest away from what we know towards what we make together shifts our focus onto how we co-ordinate with others, how we negotiate that which seems ‘real and good’ (Bass and Hosking, 1998). Who I am, and by implication who I am working with and the world we are making, is treated, from a relational perspective as being in ongoing construction, a performance improvised or a story in ongoing narration. So how we relate, co-ordinate and join together becomes of crucial importance, and we therefore need a reflective process that foregrounds that.
Why Narrative?
‘..we dream in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, despair believe, doubt, plan, revise, criticize, construct, gossip, learn, hate and love in narrative.’
(Hardy, 1968 as cited in Gergen, 1994, p 186)
Gergen uses this quotation to emphasise a significant, potential use for narrative. It is possible to locate all our actions within stories. That I am writing this paper can be narrated as a story that is nested in further stories of career, research, friendship, hopes... the list is potentially endless. My action in writing this paper makes sense, different sense, and to some audiences nonsense in working towards the valued end points (Gergen, 1994) available to different narrations. Narrative provides a powerful linguistic repertoire (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) or metaphor to support a more communal reflective process, where audiences and narrator join, where their separate voices mingle in polyphony. Different audiences or different narrators, referencing distinct linguistic repertoires or valued endpoints will render different sense making actions and co-ordinations. Which narratives are warranted as having power to illustrate intelligent action, will change with alternative narrators and audiences, the joint action I discuss later. So different audiences to this paper will construct different narratives from it; for example, readers interested in narrative will create different narratives to those whose interest-story is more in reflective practices. The key point here is that power is rephrased from being the ‘power over’ others’ stories/truth towards a ‘power to’ perform (Gergen, 1995; Hosking, 1995). 
Other metaphors are possible, of course: Newman and Holzman (1997) write of improvisation, Anderson (1997) uses conversation and, from a systemic perspective, Checkland (1981) would talk of root definitions of systems and rich pictures. Narrative is offered here as just one option that is intellectually justifiable and potentially useful. 
Several writers have written of the differences between narrative and scientific knowing (Bruner, 1986; Czarniawska, 1997; Polkinghorne, 1988). Czarniawska uses Polkinghorne's literary theory perspective, focusing on how a narrative mode of knowing emphasises plot, explanation and narrative presentation. Plot brings the actions in to a meaningful whole. So, as Gergen (1994) points out, just listing a series of actions: walking down a road and turning left, rain falling, seeing another person and so on do not make a story. However, linking them together: how we saw the rain coming, we turned left into a museum for cover and met an old friend, who we hadn't seen for years... makes a story worthwhile and meaningful. The explanation will consist of linking the course of the actions to some ‘human project’. Of particular interest, from a relational perspective is Czarniawska's point that the narrative presentation consists, not just of how we tell the story, but of how it is received and interpreted. Storytelling is a communal, not singular activity, and we will refer back to this point later as we discuss how to co-ordinate stories to support joint, collaborative action. 
An additional issue of story telling is Bruner’s argument that narrative is ‘indifferent to extra-linguistic reality’ (Bruner, 1990). A problem that truth games give the reflective practitioner is that they beg the question as to which truth, or often, within an organisational setting, whose truth. I am not arguing here for an ‘anything-goes’ relativism. What I have argued however, is that we can usefully shift our focus from discussions of what-is-true to what-will-enable co-ordination,. This becomes a local and political negotiation and we will return to this point as I offer an alternative reflective cycle. What we have instead of truth, therefore is plot, and plot is available for retelling. We can modify, develop and re-narrate the plot of a story. Looking back at stories of the past can offer us ways to re-interpret them, and so invite alternative ways of going on in relation. Stories of the past are important contextual narratives in making current actions justifiable. They have, in Austin’s (1962) terms, substantial ‘perlocutionary force’. In looking forward, we can scan the various plots available to seek desirable outcomes, in terms of participants’ projects and potential of positive collaboration.
Narrative therefore, rather than just being a way of knowing (Polkinghorne, 1988) offers reflective learners a more performative potential (Barry, 1997; White and Epston, 1990). It is creative rather than descriptive. As a consequence of its potential for multiple narrators and plots, narrative becomes a location for working out the interplay of differences without demanding a reduction to one right version (Hosking, 1995). It is perfectly possible for a narrative to have multiple tellings, themes and endings for its different characters. It is these potentials that I have attempted to encompass in the narrative, reflective cycle detailed below. In doing so, I move narrative away from its more cognitive (Polkinghorne, 1988) or epistemic (Gergen, 1994) uses towards Newman and Holzman's (1997) practice of a developing or performative development community, ‘a growing without knowing’. 
A Performative Learning Cycle
In creating an alternative learning cycle, I have set three issues that need to attention. First, I need to offer an alternative to concrete experience, secondly I need to offer an alternative to the individualism of current reflective cycles and finally I need to make a non-understanding or performative learning cycle plausible. I shall deal with these three points in turn within the discussion below: 
An alternative cycle is shown in figure 1:
[Figure 1 about here]
From ‘Concrete Experience’ to Narrative
If the reality of any events, or account of events, is only made real in relation to contextual narratives, or discourses, then the best we can offer in describing, or remembering events is a particular story. Stories can only be narrated from a perspective. What is important and so requiring inclusion, the appropriate sequence and the central characters will all depend on the valued end point or trajectory of the story to the narrator and the audience, and the discursive practices both employ. In narrating any story, different audiences will require different story contents. In recounting a meeting, I might focus on the conclusion to my boss, my anxiety to a counsellor or a funny event to my child. 
In shifting to narrative from concrete reality we can facilitate three actions. First, we foreground the valued end point: why are we telling this story and what power relations might be implicit in that valued end point?  Taking Austin's (1962) idea that we do things with words, we can lift for exploration what we are trying to do in telling this story. Secondly, in focusing on the narrating of a story, we imply an audience. Who is the audience, and who else could it be?  Would the story be different if the audience changed?  In both these two points we are offered questions that are not available to the 'realist' narratives that assume an individual engaged in reflection. The third effect of shifting from concrete experience to narrative is that we can now compare stories, which will enable improved potential for developing co-ordinated action.
Hearing Other Stories
As I have argued above, a move to stories releases us from having to play a truth game. We no longer have to reduce the multiple stories down to one correct one. In examining how we want to go on -- that is how we learn -- there are many alternative stories that can have a bearing on the ‘human project’ of which Polkinghorne (1988) wrote. In this second stage of a narrative reflective cycle, spaces are opened for such alternative stories (Freedman & Combs, 1995). It is in listening to alternative stories that we first begin to break down the individualism of conventional reflective learning cycles. One of the questions that I have found particularly powerful in helping students and clients is the simple ‘how would Bill tell that story?’  People often find it hard to use another's 'voice' to start with, but differences and conflicts can become clearer and so more tractable as people ‘hear’ others’ voices narrating relations. Issues that were considered unimportant from the original narrator's perspective might assume considerably more significance when told in another voice. We can also 'play' with other components of a story, plot, character and timing. What happens to a story when we shift the central character?  It is not uncommon for huge significance to be placed on the actions of a character, for whom another's story is unimportant. 
White and Epston (1990, see also Freedman and Combs, 1995; Barry, 1997) offer further ways of using narratives to invite new actions. Are there any ‘sub-stories’, related stories or parallel stories?  What else is happening that might help redefine what is being called the concrete experience?  ‘Archaeological stories’ -- values and beliefs are often apparent in the telling of a story -- it can be helpful to ask how a character came to believe in this way. ‘Influence stories’ - how are people influenced by the story and how do they influence it?  ‘Externalising stories’: we often tell stories of how we are (shy, thoughtless, worried etc). White and Epston argue that it can help to retell the story with the 'problem' being externalised. In making the 'problem' external to the narrator it can often be made more tractable and options for dealing with the problem can be explored. For example, stories of success: where there is a problem situation it can give new ideas to reprise a story where a similar event ended successfully. ‘Retracing stories’ -- if someone is in trouble how did they get there, and can they retrace their steps -- just as if they had got lost?  
Each of these different narrating dynamics offers a reflector a different lens to 'look' at the story she narrates. In the different retellings contrasting insights can been garnered. It is not so much that the reflector can know better because she looks at the same events from different vantage points and can so build a more accurate or complete picture. Instead, each story justifies, or invites different ways of going on (Wittgenstein, 1953). Each story adds a slightly different voice to a polyphonic community into which the reflector will act and with which she will co-ordinate.
Co-ordinating Stories
Refusing to play the truth game, that is being unwilling to accept any universal measure of what is real, offers us new tools for reflective learning. However, the narrative of a reality 'out there', outside the confines of discourse, is powerful. To be narrated as questioning the existence of facts and the 'real situation' is to lay oneself open to the charge of relativism and the threat that stories ignore 'reality' at the narrator's peril. From a relational perspective, whilst there is no universal measure of truth there will be 'local' realties (Gergen, 1994; 1995) and those realities are made real in ongoing relations. The crucial point therefore is how do stories co-ordinate with other actions in relation?  A manufacturer might claim that there is no need for product innovation, but they will still be out of business if their customer co-ordinates with this story by going elsewhere to find new products they narrate as necessary. This is the crucial point made earlier that stories are not individual but communal. That 'realities' are constructed locally makes them no less real in their impact on how people can succeed in pursuit of projects. A manager simply will not succeed in developing an innovative style of management if others, within and without her department, narrate the continued worth of an extant style of management and her innovations as no more than officious meddling. 
White and Epston (1990) write of re-authoring stories. There is a danger in this use of language, as it can imply an individual authorship. I speak of re-narrating, since I want to emphasise the joint authorship of all actions, we are but one telling of the possible stories. The process of narrating and re-narrating alternative possibilities for action can be used to search for possible new ways forward, especially where there has been friction before. The following quotation is taken from an interview with a senior community nurse during a project at a Midland's mental healthcare trust. The project had seen the reduction of in-patient beds and a shift of resources to supporting patients with dementia in the community. Unsurprisingly, the consultant, Dr Qadir​[2]​, had been unhappy with this reduction in his ability to provide what he narrated as necessary care for his patients. As a result he had been less than supportive to the project, the nurses and community care workers. In these extracts Paul, a G-grade community nurse and I considered how to involve Dr Qadir into the work of the project:
Paul		. . . he [Dr Quadir] tends to dwell on what the past was and likely to bring it up and it becomes him being defensive of things in the past and he gets stuck on that sometimes. I am sure that was what would have happened had he ever attended more of the management meetings. He would have kept going over, and over and over things in the past.
Caroline	You don’t see any ways in which you can change that, you can offer him a new story, you might say, of what is going on. What is going on in the project, well it is not a project anymore, it is the ongoing work of the community team that you know he would like?
Paul	He would like the amount of extra support that clients are getting in their homes and the feedback that he does get from carers, he would like that. Particularly, when a few times we have helped him out with situations which in the past would have resulted in admission to hospital and we have managed to contain the situation at home. Whether or not he will remember those is another thing, we will have to keep reminding him I suppose because he would be more than likely to mention times when he has needed a bed and he hasn’t found one. I can’t think of that many in Lowtown.
Here, I offered Paul a tool for re-narrating other stories of Dr Qadir's relationship to the project: ‘how could you get him to narrate his... ‘my achievement’..’ as a part of the project. Paul uses this invitation to find a story where Dr Qadir's role in a project event could be more involved and so encourage him to co-ordinate more positively with other project members. 
Caroline	So, if you take those angles that he would like, how could you get him to narrate his... ‘my achievement’ ..... and I am afraid I am cynical: the best way of getting somebody involved is to make them feel that they are part of the success.
Paul	Yes, maybe we need to. Maybe, and I am just thinking there are one or two surgeries that have asked us to do a tour, the team, and I must admit that I have just completely screwed up with thoughts of who is going to do the talk. It was probably going to be probably myself and Kath the Social Worker. But, maybe that is something I need to put to Dr Qadir that he and I and Kath could do the talk because then, one would hope that he would have to be fairly positive about us and we would have to fairly positive about him and that might help.
Having told some alternative stories it became possible for Paul and me to re-narrate future performance possibilities in a way that might co-ordinate with Dr Qadir’s stories. It is not important to the narrative if Dr Qadir was, in any real sense, positive about the project, but it is important that the story is narrated in such a way as gain his co-ordination. Furthermore, it is significant that there is no universal measure as to co-ordination, there can be no universal descriptor of positive or negative co-ordination, no normative formula. Rather co-ordination can only be valued in local, emergent and temporary terms. This local and temporary evaluation of narrative co-ordination became clear later as the story developed.
Elsewhere this emphasis on co-ordinating stories has been called ‘pacing’ (Bass and Hosking, 1998; Ramsey, 1998). The analogy is of relay runners passing a baton. Each runner must pace their run perfectly for the hand over to be completed successfully. Brown and Duguid (1991) illuminate problems between management and photocopier representatives as being a problem of different storytelling styles. The consequences that they noted were of the two groups being distanced and mutually dismissive of each other's efforts. A focus on co-ordinating stories invited and enabled Paul to review issues that were important to Dr Qadir and so look for creative ways of including him on, what could be called mutual terms. In Gergen's (1995) terms what was achieved was a pursuit of power to join stories rather than one story gaining power over another.
Joint Action
The story with Paul didn't end 'happily ever after'. On reflection, our narration of the problems he faced was too blinkered. Other stories lurked in the background; a merger with another trust, changes in senior management, including the project manager leaving, the Regional Health Authority pushing for additional in-patient bed cuts and increasing alienation between medical and social care workers. All these parallel stories, to use White and Epston's (1990) term, impinged on the relations Paul and I were seeking to improve. Action was not individual but jointly performed, and the parties involved in the performance were more than we could have known about. Again we can see illustrated that there is no universal, normative co-ordination scale, only the ongoing local and improvised processes and stories of re-creating relations. What we could know in this situation was always limited; we could only seek to develop our performance, a growing without knowing, and so be available for new joint performances as they were offered for co-ordination.
It is this jointly performed relational process of action that is crucial to a relational learning cycle. Management theory has been beset with individualism and what has been called subject-object relations (Friere, 1970/93; Hosking, 1999). Conventionally, management theorists tell us how to manage, motivate, envision, empower and change subordinates. This language carries with it the implicit understanding that the manager is active and the subordinate is a passive object, there to be managed, motivated etc. Relational and Humanistic perspectives argue that we co-create our worlds (Garfinkel, 1967; Reason, 1988; 1994; Shotter, 1993). Management and learning techniques that favour such individualism will inevitably lead to friction, as Foucault (1979) argued every assertion provides the possibility of resistance. 
From a relational perspective, the individualism of subject-object relations is impossible. Mary Gergen and Ken Smith (1995) tell a story of a student group where one of the members of the group started to dominate the others. Whilst Smith looked to the dominant character’s personal history and ‘internal dynamics’ to explain the behaviour; Gergen used the analogy of dance to capture the way that the group as a whole created the dominant-submissive roles. Each had their steps that promoted the others actions - dance steps. In a recent project, (Fereday Smith, 2000) a team of physiotherapists explored the possibilities for increasing and improving continuous professional development. In using participative research methodologies (Reason, 1988), the team discovered that it was not so much the individuals who were developing as a result of their initiatives, but the team as a whole. The term of communitied development was used to capture this social development. The development of individual members of the team was dependent upon, and constructive of ongoing, developing relationships. Quite unexpected personal development occurred as new ways of working together. Those, who had previously been positioned (Davies and Harré, 1991) in terms of hierarchy, were repositioned as helpers, listeners or confidantes.
For a community such as a group of western, educated academics and consultants, it is difficult to conceptualise learning that is not individual. Other cultures would not have such a problem, in Africa, for example the concept of ‘Ubunto’ (Mbigi, 1997) captures the idea that ‘we are through others’. There, communitied learning would not seem so unusual. In Europe and Northern America as well, learning is increasingly being theorised as a social process (eg Brown & Duguid, 1991; Hosking, 1999) with what can be claimed to have been learned warranted as such within local communities (Gergen, 1994).
Concluding Comments 
From a relational perspective, it would be incongruous to argue that a narrative learning cycle is right and others are wrong. Instead this narrative approach is offered as an alternative that addresses some of the problems identified in current, individualistic learning cycles. I have argued, however, that a narrative cycle does offer some genuine benefits to those wishing to develop reflective skills, even if not necessarily from a relational perspective. The use of narrative contributes in three ways to improved reflective, experiential learning. 
First, using narrative facilitates the 'hearing' of other voices. I have argued that, even when ostensibly done on one's own, narrative reflection enables the reflector to attend to alternative perspectives, values and projects. Different 'narrators', 'heroes' or plots all bring a richer texture than a single, concrete experience. Secondly, by promoting co-ordination as a key device of reflection, narrative lifts the unavoidable communal nature of any action and provides an opportunity developing action in the light of others' narratives. Finally, in using re-narration tools, narrative builds in creative and performative potential to reflection. The focus moves away from adapting action to match a 'real' environment, towards jointly produced activity.
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